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. . there is always a danger in historical interpretation of mistaking the obvious to us for 
the eternally bbvious.-IAN MUELLER 
Euclid’s Elements (Stoicheia) was not the first book of its kind-an encyclope- 
dic, postulatory-deductive treatment of elementary mathematics; Hippocrates of 
Chios, Leon, and Theudius of Magnesia wrote Elements before Euclid. These 
earlier writings were lost, while Euclid’s synthesis survived to become almost 
synonymous with Greek elementary geometry and, at the same time, representa- 
tive of Greek mathematics in general. Since its knowledge and methods are pre- 
supposed by the more advanced mathematical studies and their methods (tonics, 
neusis constructions, invention of higher curves, arithmetico-algebraic investiga- 
tions a la Diophantus, etc.), it is only fair (puce Fowler) [Fowler 19831 to see in the 
Elements, as Mueller does, a main source for the “understanding of the classical 
Greek conception of mathematics and its foundations and of the similarities and 
differences between that conception and our own” (p. viii). 
To provide such an understanding is Mueller’s main objective and, I believe, he 
succeeds remarkably well in achieving it. I do not believe, however, that his 
survey of the contents of the Elements is less “cumbersome . . . for someone 
neither familiar with the Elements nor willing to expend a great deal of labor to 
become familiar with them” (sic; p. viii) than Heath’s. Perhaps the opposite is the 
case. Reading Mueller’s book, I became more convinced than ever of the correct- 
ness of my views [Unguru 1975, 1979; Unguru & Rowe 1981, 19821, that ordinary 
and straightforward geometrical languages are the only historically acceptable 
metalanguages for explicating Euclid in particular and Greek mathematics in gen- 
eral. That algebra will not do is, by now, accepted by most historians (including 
Ian Mueller); that a symbolism a la Mueller will not do either, without too high a 
price to pay that makes it self-defeating, is at present also clear. (More on Muel- 
ler’s symbolism below.) 
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ln order to achieve his aim, while emphasizing philosophical, foundational, and 
logical questions, Mueller investigates with great thoroughness and care the con- 
tents and the structure of the Elements, arriving, interestingly enough, at impor- 
tallt conclusions notable precisely for their historical depth and accuracy. His 
account, then, though motivated by structural considerations, issues in judgments 
of high historical import and plausibility which reviewers so far have either 
gbjssed over or entirely overlooked. 
The book contains seven chapters, four appendixes, a bibliography, and a (very 
iniidequate) index. The material is arranged according to broad topics which are 
di ;cussed in terms of some logically central propositions and their relations to the 
06 her propositions constituting the discussed topic. Mueller’s methodological cri- 
tel-ion, then, is the internal logic of the Elements, and this forces on him quite a bit 
of dislocation with respect to the order of the materials in the Elements. Thus he 
begins with a discussion of Book I (in which I.45 is the central proposition) and 
part of Book II, using Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie as the modern counter- 
part to Euclid in order to emphasize the differences between the two, and he 
taj:kles from the very beginning the central issue of the relationship between 
geometry and algebra as relating to Book II. He next discusses Euclidean arith- 
m’:tic (Books VII-IX), the theory of proportion (Book V) and its applications to 
plane rectilineal figures (Book VI), the circle and its relation to rectilineal figures 
(looks III and IV), in the context of which he also deals with Hippocrates of 
&os and the method of exhaustion (X11.2). The last two chapters tackle, in turn, 
eli:mentary solid geometry and the method of exhaustion (Books XI and X11) 
arrd the Platonic solids (Book XIII), in connection with which Mueller also in- 
VB stigates the classifications of irrational lines (Book X) and the remainder of 
Bl,ok 11. 
Ian Mueller’s book is rich and varied in content, forcing reviewers to difficult 
sdlection criteria concerning those aspects of his thought that they find particu- 
la-ly important for emphasis. I deem fundamental Mueller’s definitive and apodic- 
tic: determination that Greek mathematics is unlike modern mathematics, with 
respect to the role of geometry in each, and his unambiguous rejection of the 
aJ:ebraic interpretation of the Elements as either historically justified or enlighten- 
itis. I shall, therefore, concentrate my essay on this issue, the importance of which 
cannot be overemphasized. But before I do this, I would like to dispose of a 
problem that may trouble the unwary reader of the book. As Mueller repeatedly 
says, a basic difference between modern and ancient mathematics consists in “the 
dominant role of structure” in the former and “its virtual absence” in the latter 
(pp. ix-x). He goes on to point out that “Greek mathematics should not be 
initerpreted in terms of structure” (p. 10). And yet his emphasis and major concern 
throughout the book is with deductive relationships, “deductive structure and 
fdundations,” logical and philosophical questions. Is there no contradiction here? 
Is not Mueller emphasizing the nonexistent? Not necessarily. Greek mathematics 
~Cldies objects between which there exist logical relationships that the scholar can 
discern and analyze, while modern mathematics emphasizes and studies the logi- 
cal relationships themselves that obtain between objects, such that the scholar 
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looking at modern mathematics and dissecting it is twice removed from the mathe- 
matical objects. In other words, the objects of modern mathematics are them- 
selves structures. Mueller’s concern, then, is legitimate. 
We come now to what I consider Mueller’s main achievement, namely, his 
irrefutable demonstration that Euclid can be understood in his own right, as a 
geometer, and that appeal to algebraic interpretations is distorting, unnecessary, 
and illegitimate. This conclusion is reached with respect to any and all aspects of 
the Elements and gains in weight and impact as one advances in reading the book, 
additional arguments being continually added to it from various directions, flesh- 
ing out its far-reaching implications, and, ultimately, claiming the unmitigated 
assent of the attentive and not irredeemably biased reader. I shall mention only 
the main signposts on the road to this inescapable conclusion. 
It is quite clearly out of the question that one could establish the algebraic interpretation of 
much of Greek mathematics on the basis of vocabulary or explicit procedures. Rather, such 
an interpretation depends upon reading texts like book II as saying something other than what 
they appear to be saying. the structural conception of mathematics, which is the core of 
algebra, is essentially foreign to Euclid. . . the argument surely does provide prima facie 
grounds for doubting the viability of the algebraic interpretation. (p. 43) 
Of course. And this prima facie evidence for the geometric interpretation is suffi- 
ciently plausible in the case of some of the most fundamental propositions of 
“geometric algebra ” “to render the importation of algebra unnecessary” (p. 44). 
Moreover, when one performs the importation, different propositions in Euclid 
(11.1-3) become various forms (consequences) of the same proposition (II.l), 
which is not the way Euclid sees them, for whom each “states an independent 
geometric fact” (p. 46). This, by the way, is not an isolated case [l]. Furthermore, 
and in general, when one analyzes the central tenets of the algebraic interpreta- 
tion, namely, that the lines and areas of “geometric algebra” express arbitrary 
quantities, that “geometric algebra” represents a geometric translation of Babylo- 
nian algebra, and that, as Van der Waerden put it, the line of thought in Greek 
mathematics is basically algebraic, one finds each and all of these tenets funda- 
mentally bankrupt. It is clear then that “Euclid is approaching his subject by 
looking at the geometric properties of particular spatial configurations and not by 
considering abstract relations between quantities or formal relations between ex- 
pressions” (p. 52). 
This general assessment is buttressed by further arguments, each one represent- 
ing one more nail in the coffin of the algebraic reading of Greek mathematics. 
Thus, showing that in the case of addition commutativity is taken for granted, 
while it is not so for multiplication (cf. VII.16), Mueller makes the very pertinent 
remark, supporting [Unguru & Rowe 19811 in their contention that rectangle 
formation is not multiplication [2]: “Of course commutativity would be obvious if 
multiplication were identified with forming a rectangle” (p. 73). Nor can one find 
the fundamental theorem of arithmetic in the Elements, VII.30-31 notwithstand- 
ing: “The sensible way to describe this situation would seem to be to say that 
although the Eiements contains the materials for proving the fundamental theo- 
rem, it contains neither the theorem nor the equivalent of it” (p. 83). Moreover, 
Hid 12 ESSAY REVIEW 179 
campounding ratios and multiplication are not identical; this, needless to say, has 
devastating implications for the algebraic reading of the Elements. It follows 
immediately that neither does Euclid construe duplicating and triplicating as, 
re,;pectively, squaring and cubing. Also, a careful examination of the arithmetic 
books makes it clear that for Euclid arithmetic and “geometric algebra” are 
se3arate endeavors, the former involving a combinatorial line of thought based on 
tb: notion of numbers as multitudes composed of units. 
This brings us naturally to the Eudoxean theory of proportions contained in 
BCtok V. There is a world of difference between it and a theory of real numbers. 
The elements of such a theory cannot be uncovered in the Elements since ratios 
an: not objects and there is no ordering relation of “being less than” between 
numerical ratios. Coupled with this is the fact that magnitudes in the Elements are 
abstractions from geometric objects (not including numbers), that Euclid’s con- 
cerns in dealing with ratios are anything but calculational, and that Euclid failed to 
es!.ablish a correlation between his two treatments of proportionality (that for 
mltgnitudes and that for numbers) before attempting to combine them in Book X, a 
bli:mish in which Mueller sees “the greatest foundational flaw in the Elements” 
(p 138). All this means that Book V, in spite of its “abstract” character, does not 
rel>resent an attempt at complete axiomatization of proportion theory, but rather 
an attempt to abandon the realm of intuition for that of precise, formally correct 
definitions (5 and 7), enabling one to deal rigorously with equalities of ratios: 
“1Yhat is missing in Book V from a modern point of view is exactly the axiomatic 
foi mdation-the existential assumptions and combinatorial laws which underlie 
thl: whole book” (p. 148). 
Book VI of the Elements has been typically considered, mainly because of 
VI -28-29, together with Book II, to be a mainstay of “geometric algebra.” Muel- 
let,‘s thorough discussion of these propositions disposes effectively of their alge- 
briic interpretation, showing that they are fully and satisfactorily graspable as 
geometric propositions [3] that function, moreover, as lemmas for other proposi- 
tiqns (VI.28 for X.33-34 and implicitly for X.17-18 and many more in Book X, 
Vj.29, which is never used in Book X, for VI.30). “Thus,” to take VI.29 as an 
example, “it can be said that if the interpretation of II,4 as a geometric truth is 
accepted, the desire to prove VI.30 provides the basis for a satisfactory geometric 
explanation of the discovery and proof of VI.29” (p. 169). This, by the way, is not 
an isolated instance in the Elements, where a great many propositions comprising 
tht: so-called “geometric algebra” are proved and included not for their own sake 
but for their future geometric lemmatical use in other propositions. 
Propositions VI.28-29 have been typically tied in with “Babylonian algebra” 
and a great deal has been made of their alleged identity and its implications for the 
cdntacts between the two mathematical cultures. Mueller rejects the Babylonian 
trlnsfer myth (cf. pp. 170-172), though he chooses to say nothing about the 
hit;torical legitimacy of the algebraic interpretation of Babylonian mathematics. 
Fir the sake of his arguments, he describes it lucidly, without taking an explicit 
and forceful stand on its real (historical) value. At times he even seems to embrace 
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it, somewhat bashfully perhaps (cf. p. 176, n. 21). However, his intellectual hon- 
esty leaves him no choice but, in the end, to conclude: 
Nevertheless. I am not inclined to adopt the “Babylonian” explanation of Euclid’s geometric 
algebra. Given the present state of our knowledge of the two bodies of mathematics and of the 
contact between the two cultures, the explanation raises as many problems as it solves. I shall 
therefore continue to try to establish that the “line of thought” in the Elemenrs can be 
satisfactorily understood in terms of its surface geometric character. (p. 172) 
In discussing elementary solid geometry and the method of exhaustion, Mueller 
makes the following pertinent points: (1) Elementary proportion theory is used in 
the Elements to avoid complex arguments concerning solid geometry but it is 
never used in an abstract computational manner as a replacement for geometric 
reasoning. (2) There are profound conceptual differences between Euclid’s 
method of exhaustion, in which the “limit” (the geometrical object) is always 
given in advance, and the integral calculus in which one has to find the limit, if 
any, of a given sequence. Even though it is possible to see Euclid’s technique as 
an “integration” technique, it is, nevertheless, always performed in innocence of 
a justificatory, theoretical law; its standard steps are always adapted to the partic- 
ular geometrical issue at hand, precisely because of the absence of a theory of 
limits in Greek mathematics and the intuitive, unsatisfactory level of the concept 
of continuity which reigns in it. (3) Books Xl and XII are exclusively geometric in 
character and one of their most striking features is the total elimination of the 
calculatory aspect. 
Mueller concludes his analysis of the Elements with a connected discussion of 
Books X and XIII which also comprises a sprinkling of the pertinent propositions 
of Book II. What deserves mention here is that Mueller recognizes the purely 
classificatory and qualitative character of Book X while, at the same time, force- 
fully and cogently rejecting any attempt at algebraic explanations of any of the 
three Books. He argues, for example, that Euclid’s motivation in proving proposi- 
tions X.17-18 lies in the need to fit the edge of the regular icosahedron into a 
classificatory scheme. Indeed, “. . . the qualitative scheme evolved in book X is 
itself a sufficient explanation of the reasoning gone through to reach it” (p. 270). 
Iu the same connection, Mueller argues that X.91-102, in which the varius apoto- 
mes are discussed, are primary and fundamental because of their role in the 
determination of the edge value of the icosahedron; while the corresponding 
discussion of binomials and additive sides (X.54-65) is derivative, as it can easily 
be obtained from the former by simple combinatorial changes (it follows that the 
opposite is also true!), plays no role whatever in the Elements, and suffers from 
even more arbitrariness than the treatment of the apotomes. Mueller may be right. 
Still, his argumentation is largely ad hoc, the most telling point in its favor being 
the role played by the later propositions in obtaining the conclusions about the 
edge of the icosahedron. Finally, Mueller’s discussions and drawings of the Pla- 
tonic solids are much clearer than those one normally encounters in investigations 
of the topic and they make a very useful contribution toward an understanding of 
the matters dealt with by Euclid in Book XIII. 
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rhere is much, much more in Mueller’s impressive book that deserves empha- 
sit, but, for obvious reasons, what precedes should do [4]. Let me now mention, 
succinctly, my main criticisms of the book. Ian Mueller’s logical symbolism is 
oppressive and opaque [5]. It seems to me that what one conceivably gains by its 
use in fathoming Euclid’s deductive structure is achieved at the prohibitively high 
prce of losing sight of Euclid’s actual, commonsensical, convincing, elementary, 
syllogistico-geometric, rhetorical inference pattern (cf., for instance, pp. 70-71, 
84-85, and the generalized discussions of Books X and XII). It is a symbolism 
cdnsisting of a mixture of traditional and innovative notations that makes high 
dqmands on the reader and, at least in my case, forces him to go back very often to 
th: Euclidean text for enlightenment and elucidation. This being the case with 
someone who is reasonably familiar with Euclid, it appears that Mueller’s proce- 
dure is self-defeating and his goal of replacing Heath’s Euclid unachievable by 
Mueller’s means. Cases in point are the generalized discussion of proofs in Book 
XI.1 and the abstract and largely diagramless, as well as disjointed, discussion 
(with respect to the Euclidean text) of the various irrational lines in Book X, in 
cdnnection with the determination of the edge of the icosahedron. Both are ex- 
ceedingly complicated, requiring constant recourse to good old Euclid and to 
vdrious parts of Mueller’s book. Thus, while Euclid’s proof of XII.5 takes only 
slightly more than two pages in the Great Books edition of the Elements, Mueller’s 
alt.ernative proof-in which he also includes a very brief rendering of X11.3-is 
sflread over almost four and a half dense pages of highly demanding and symboli- 
cally couched argument (cf. pp. 236-240) [6]. Concerning the treatment of Book 
X I am not at all sure that Mueller’s abstract, symbolic procedure has strong 
ad vantages over other, standard treatments of the book (Dijksterhuis’, for exam- 
pl:) and I can discern quite a few disadvantages. 
It is clear that Mueller’s book cannot replace the Euclidean text (or Heath’s 
edition of it for that matter), because, among other reasons, Mueller plays havoc 
WI th the Euclidean arrangement and structure by rearranging and regrouping dis- 
pa.rate things and by continually digging for structure. Additionally, both the 
ef unciations and the proofs of Mueller are as a rule simplified, precisely because 
his guide is structural and, therefore, he will extract the “significant” and leave 
oust the “superfluous,” sometimes by contracting, other times by dilating (or 
sqparating) Euclidean enunciations, appealing to the converse proposition when 
Ellclid deals with the direct, etc., very often needlessly complicating matters for 
the historically minded reader (cf., for instance, his discussion of 111.10, on pp. 
14 2- 194). That Mueller is fully aware of his procedural dislocations is clear from 
some of his explicit statements: 
Euclid clearly thinks of subject matter as a more important organizing principle than deduc- 
tive relevance-a fact which makes it difficult to read the Elenlents straight through. (p. 204) 
In general he [Euclid] does not seem to have a clear sense of the proportion-theoretic 
relations between various propositions so that cumbersome geometric argument is sometimes 
used when a simple proportionality argument would suffice. I have chosen not to go into the 
details of the geometric argument at such junctures in the belief that its complexity hinders 
more than it helps [!I in understanding Euclid’s solid geometry. (p. 230) 
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Finally: 
This description involves some adaptation of the proofs [in which Euclid uses the method of 
exhaustion in Book XII] because Euclid does not follow a prescribed uniform procedure but 
adjusts his techniques to the problem at hand. (p. 231) 
Ian Mueller is, as we saw, squarely against the algebraic interpretation of the 
Elements. The arguments advanced are presented cooly and in a deliberateiy 
balanced tone that is factual and nonjudgmental. This nonantagonistic, noncon- 
frontational tone is, clearly, meant to shun the ire of the “old guard” in the history 
of mathematics. It may even be successful. Sometimes, however, it leads to 
awkward situations as when, in the process of criticizing (again calmly and nonan- 
tagonistically) the central claims of the algebraic interpretation of Book II (cf. pp. 
50-52), Mueller quotes H. G. Zeuthen (may he rest in peace) explicitly while 
referring (in the same footnote) only allusively and in a twice-removed fashion to 
Neugebauer (may he grace us with many more years of seminal contributions to 
the field). “Le style c’est I’homme. ” In the same connection, since he has shown 
conclusively that there is nothing algebraic about “geometric algebra,” I find 
Mueller’s use of the term without quotation marks unjustified and even mislead- 
ing. Since a great many of his readers will naturally belong to the casual category 
(absorbing the important and deep “messages” of the book requires commitment 
to the topic and a lengthy time investment), there is a fair likelihood that they will 
be misled. That is a pity, since what is conceivably gained by assuaging the fury of 
the “geometrical algebraists” is more than counterbalanced by the damages stem- 
ming from faithfulness to the old, discredited usage. Thus, even some reviewers 
have failed to point out this crucial contribution of the book. This failure goes 
hand in hand, I think, with Mueller’s own failure to discard the misleading term. 
Cui prodest? Illustrative of what I have in mind is the following passage: 
[Propositions II,] 4-7 are, of course, fundamental examples of geometric algebra and are used 
frequently in the Elements. As far as I am able to determine, there is nothing in the Elements 
themselves which makes the algebraic interpretation of the propositions more natural than 
the straightforward geometric one. (p. 301) 
I would like to point out now a few more or less trivial mistakes that mar this 
otherwise excellent book. In two neighboring paragraphs (p. 289), Mueller says, 
concerning Euclid’s classification of irrational lines, that “From a purely formalis- 
tic point of view one could hardly ask for more in a classification,” a high praise, I 
assume; and, then, “Proposition 115 gives a clear demonstration of one of the 
limitations of the classificatory scheme developed in book X by showing that there 
are infinitely many kinds of straight lines which it fails to categorize,” a serious 
criticism, presumably, of an important formal aspect of the classification. Obvi- 
ously, then, one could ask Euclid to come up with a classificatory schema that 
would be exhaustive of the objects of his classification! 
At times (p. 83, Mueller seems to think (wrongly, I believe) that it is possible to 
give non-Euclidean formulations to Euclidean propositions, while preserving their 
basically Euclidean character. 
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There appears to be a mistake on page 293, when Mueller claims that X.33-34 
lu+e never used subsequently; they are used, respectively in X.76 and X.77. On 
l,age 246 Archimedes’ 1.34, Sphere and Cylinder, is quoted mistakenly. On page 
‘!65 commensurability in length is mistakenly identified with commensurability in 
:;quare. Finally, Hilbert’s Gesammelte Abhandlungen, quoted on page 4, does not 
;ippear in the Bibliography. 
In conclusion, Mueller’s book represents a major contribution to Euclidean 
:;tudies, a uade mecum for anyone interested in Greek mathematics that will take 
~ ts honored place at the side of Heath’s monumental edition, which it supplements 
;md enriches. In his book Mueller demolishes, one after another, the shibboleths 
l,f the algebraic interpretation of the Elements, making a shambles of the central 
: enets of this interpretation, and he does this calmly, cooly and matter-of-factly, 
I-caching the inescapable verdict about the geometric character of Euclid’s master- 
!,iece. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no longer a substantive excuse for 
Ltnyone to go on speaking of “geometric algebra,” “the Greek solution to quadrat- 
ITS,” and the “Greek geometric translation of Babylonian algebra.” Cleaving 
i’urther to such an interpretation, then, is explainable in psycho-sociological 
l.ather than in substantive terms. It would be overly optimistic, however, to 
I:xpect things to change quickly. But they must change and will change sooner or 
iater, simply because inertia in scholarship, while both functional and valuable for 
ts survival value, is not eternal. The need to rewrite the history of Greek mathe- 
:natics has now been recognized and is, slowly but surely, gaining increasingly the 
Iicceptance of the scholarly community. Let it be. 
As Ian Mueller put it, “. . . the significance of the Elements lies less in its final 
ilestination than in the regions travelled through to reach it. To a greater extent 
,.han perhaps any other major work in the history of mathematics, the Elements 
,ue [sic] a mathematical world” (p, 303), and this world, the Greek mathematical 
,vorld, is not the world of algebra: This Mueller has shown beyond the shadow of a 
lloubt and, although this may not have been his telos, I see in this his main 
; achievement . 
NOTES 
1. For similar arguments, see [Unguru 19751. 
2. It is gratifying lo point out here that there is complete agreement between the arguments and 
I:onclusions of Mueller and those of [Unguru 1975; Unguru & Rowe 1981, 19821 with respect to the 
i;eometric, nonalgebraic character of the Elements and of much else in Greek mathematics. 
3. See the lengthy discussion on the status of these propositions in [Unguru & Rowe 19821. 
4. For instance, what Mueller says about Euclid’s use of superposition and motion in geometry is 
both enlightening and convincing. It effectively disposes, I think, of the argument of Robert J. Wagner 
in “Euclid’s Intended Interpretation of Superposition” (Historia Mathematics 10 (1983), 63-70). A 
i)rompt review of Mueller’s book, then, might have conceivably saved the journal some space and 
t:aused the potential contributor to Historia Mathematics some second thoughts; all things considered, 
ilot too high a price to pay for speedy publication of reviews. Since a fair review means doing justice to 
IIn author, the known maxim applies: “Justice (review) delayed is justice denied.” 
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5. For instance, Mueller’s discussion of definition VII.21 complicates matters needlessly and is far 
from clear and convincing. 
6. For fairness’ sake, I should point out that Mueller’s alternative proofs of propositions X11.10-12 
are much shorter than Euclid’s. 
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